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Introduction
Americans do not want private information about their activities to
be known, but they feel very strongly that information collected by the
government should be available to the press, the purported guardians of
the "right to know" in a democracy.' On a commercial level, the typical
American daily faces the dilemma of whether to choose a service that
will get a job done quickly but will reveal personal information to others,
such as the use of a checking account to pay bills, or to choose a less
convenient method that does not require disclosure of personal informa-
tion, such as paying bills with cash.
Consumers in the telecommunications area also face this dilemma.
In the United States, consumers have come to expect a certain amount of
privacy when using telecommunications systems. Perhaps the aspect of
telecommunications about which consumers have the highest expectation
of privacy is the content of telephone communications. When a person
picks up a telephone to place a call, she expects that no one will listen to
the conversation without permission. This expectation of privacy is a
basic part of American wiretap law and is closely related to the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.2
There are only a few situations in which the content of a call may be
legally monitored,3 and there are a number of laws and regulations that
limit or prohibit the ability of others to listen in on private
conversations.4
The government, accordingly, rarely regulates the content of calls.
One exception to this policy is the area of 900 "harmful matter" calls. In
1. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6) (1988).
2. See Wiretap Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1988); United States v. Magana, 512
F.2d 1169, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975).
3. This includes calls from one person in a business to another at the same location (or
on the same internal system). The internal system would include non-telephone company
equipment, such as a private branch exchange (PBX). Public utility regulations do not apply
in these cases. However, in California at least, calls to or from customer-owned terminal
equipment that interact with the public switched network are subject to the provisions of Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) General Order (G.O.) 107-b.
4. Some of these laws in California are:
CPUC G.O. 107-b. This order restricts monitoring or recording of telephone conversa-
tions, except when notice that such monitoring or recording is taking place is given either
through a "beep tone" or by clearly marking telephone equipment that is for internal company
use that may be monitored, or by mutual consent of all parties to the conversation. Id. Other
exceptions include monitoring by law enforcement or national defense agencies as permitted by
law, or by telephone utilities as permitted by law to prevent fraud or to identify the source of
lewd or harassing calls. Id.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7903 (West 1992). This section allows for the imposition of
fines and/or imprisonment against any telephone company employee who "in any way uses or
appropriates any information derived by him from any private message passing through his
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California, legislation and the resulting rules of the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC or Commission) mandate that all calls to
900 numbers that involve "harmful matter" must be carried on a specific
prefix: (900) 303-xxxx. Although the CPUC does not restrict the con-
tent itself, it does segregate it.5
A new wireless radio telephone technology, cellular telephones, al-
lows an individual to use a telephone while driving a car or relaxing on
the beach. The technology used to provide this service cannot, however,
guarantee a private line. As a result, the federal courts have found that
reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist when an individual is
using a cellular telephone.6
Cellular phone calls are inherently nonprivate. The relatively small
number of frequencies that can be used in cellular phone communication
makes those calls vulnerable to eavesdropping. Privacy concerns relating
to cellular phone communication have been minimized in recent years as
a result of changes in technology that enable a cellular call to be passed
repeatedly between different cells at different frequencies, making it diffi-
cult to listen to any given conversation. However, a scanner is now avail-
able that actually allows a party to monitor cellular phone calls.7
Beyond content, privacy issues are present in many aspects of tele-
communications. At the center of these issues is the problem that an
individual must release personal information to a private company in or-
hands, and addressed to any other person, or in any other manner acquired by him by reason
of his trust as such agent, operator or employee .... " Id.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7905 (West 1992). This section requires that the CPUC issue
regulations requiring regulated telephone companies to maintain records of all instances in
which an eavesdropping device has been discovered to have been installed over its lines. Cur-
rently, each company makes such a report to the CPUC. Id.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7906 (West 1992). This section requires the CPUC to deter-
mine whether regulated telephone companies are taking adequate steps to insure the privacy of
communications over its lines. Id.
5. This issue has been the subject of much litigation over First Amendment rights and
other issues. The Ninth Circuit has found that the phone utilities have the ability to decide
which 900 lines constitute adult matter and to assign these to the 303 prefix. Information
Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.
1991). This is one of a very few situations in which the telephone company or the CPUC may
step in and act on the basis of the content of a call.
6. United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 196-97 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Smith,
978 F.2d 171, 177 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, No. 92-7631, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 2366 (U.S.
Mar. 22, 1993); Goodall's Charter Bus Serv. Inc. v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 178 Cal.
Rptr. 21 (Ct. App. 1981).
7. Relying on CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2885, the CPUC concluded that cellular cus-
tomers should be provided with a sticker to place on their phones reminding them of the
potential that their conversations may be overheard, and that persons placing cellular calls
should be given the responsibility to inform the person to whom they are speaking that conver-
sations may not be totally private. Re Privacy of Communications by Cellular Mobile Radio-
telephone, 24 C.P.U.C. 2d 498, 501 (1987).
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der to receive services considered necessary in modem life. To obtain
telephone service, one must give one's name, address, billing address, and
credit background. Of course, the telephone company must also know a
person's telephone number(s). Further, the telephone company obtains
personal information about one's calling patterns in order to bill for serv-
ices, and the company also has technological means to determine the
content of one's calls. Because people have no alternative but to release
personal information to a private telephone company in order to obtain
telephone services, questions concerning the use of this information have
become the subject of legitimate public policy concerns.
Another area relevant to privacy concerns involves emerging com-
petition and the desire of more firms to obtain customer information held
traditionally only by the local telephone utility. In the competitive mar-
ket, firms use information to gain a market advantage. Monopoly tele-
communications utilities use information in the same way competitive
firms do; the monopoly firm will make use of its customer information
for billing, infrastructure planning, and marketing. As long as the utility
is a monopoly, there is little concern about other firms having access to
the information, because there is no need to make the information avail-
able. However, as the telecommunications markets in which a utility op-
erates become more competitive, competing firms want access to the
utility's information in order to minimize the utility's market advantage.
Competing firms will attempt to gain access to such information by per-
suading both the monopoly firm and relevant regulatory and legislative
agencies to provide competitors with access to information the utility
holds. As the information floodgates open, it is difficult for regulators to
control access to information. Regulators can easily control the dissemi-
nation of information in a monopoly environment, but it is more difficult
in a competitive environment.'
Possible release of much of the utility's information to competitors
and marketing firms raises privacy concerns. Thus, privacy is inevitably
intertwined with issues of competition. A telephone utility has an advan-
tage in marketing competitive services if it alone knows the calling pat-
terns of customers, because it can then target its marketing to
appropriate customers. However, commercial firms also desire access to
this information in order to improve their own target marketing. As
demographic information becomes available to competing interests, those
8. This is particularly true for those who have Caller Identification service, whereby the
called party is able to receive the phone number of the caller. It would be impossible for
regulators, in a competitive environment, to prevent users of the Caller ID service from selling
the lists of individuals who had called their number. For example, if an airline company had
Caller ID service, it could sell its list of callers to marketers of travel services.
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interests' opportunities to sell their products effectively will increase. For
example, long-distance telephone companies may target their marketing
pitches to customers with certain calling frequencies or patterns. The
result is that the personal habits of any individual-calls revealing a per-
son's sexual habits, political preferences, or product interests-may be-
come available to the public.9
While marketers do not generally want information for the purposes
of invading privacy or controlling individual consumers' actions (rather,
they want it to gain better access to dollars), unwanted marketing is only
the tip of the iceberg. Individuals generally do not want it known to the
public to whom they speak, where they call, and at what times they make
their calls. For example, Pacific Bell proposed in 1986 to offer lists of
residential and business customers' telephone numbers and related infor-
mation for rent. This information was intended for the use of potential
competitors in the directory business to facilitate the compilation of their
own directory database. However, an outcry ensued-which was exten-
sively covered by the media-because residential consumer advocates
were concerned that unlisted and unpublished numbers would be re-
leased, thereby jeopardizing the privacy of these customers.1" Pacific
Bell eventually withdrew its proposal.
In the future, telecommunications policy makers will have to decide
whether to permit greater and better access to information by commer-
cial interests, while simultaneously protecting the utility (and indirectly
its ratepayers) from unfair loss of competitive advantages, and protecting
consumers from the release of information traditionally deemed
private. 1
9. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958), in which the Court rejected the
effort by a state to force the NAACP to disclose its membership lists. The Supreme Court
recognized an interest in anonymity in order to safeguard the constitutionally protected right
of association.
10. See infra Parts I and II for a discussion of federal and state privacy protections.
11. At the CPUC, ongoing proceedings are exploring the issue of who owns customer
information. In one case, Reuben H. Donnelly Corp. complained that Pacific Bell gave infor-
mation to its subsidiary, Pacific Bell Directory, that was not given to actual or potential direct
competitors to Pacific Bell Directory. This, said Donnelly (both an actual and potential com-
petitor in different areas), gave Pacific Bell Directory an unfair advantage in the market based
upon its unique position as a utility with access to customer information. Reuben H. Donnelly
Corp. v. Pacific Bell, 39 C.P.U.C. 2d 209, 223 (1991).
Donnelly's complaint was denied on technical interpretations of the Public Utilities Code,
but the more generic issues remain unsettled. While Donnelly and other competitors may or
may not have the right to customer information for business reasons, what about the rights of
the customer whose information is revealed? Should customers have the right to determine
who receives personal information regarding their activities?
The Commission instituted the Investigation into Competitive Access to Customer List In-
formation (List 011) to explore the issues of ownership of customer information and the trade-
offs between competitive access and privacy.
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Beyond sharing customer information between telephone compa-
nies, current technology allows the customer to manipulate personal in-
formation. One such service is Caller Identification (Caller ID), a service
through which the party being called can access the phone number of the
caller. This service raises questions about who has greater rights, the
caller or the called; whether persons with unlisted phone numbers should
have different rights than others; and whether there are some phone
numbers (such as AIDS or drug hotlines and battered spouse centers'
numbers) for which extraordinary privacy concerns should be
considered.
As an individual's informational privacy is being besieged both by
competitors within the telecommunications industry and by the availabil-
ity of technology that releases this information to anyone, it is essential
for policy makers to determine when and where an individual's privacy
rights come into play. This article focuses on the policy and legal issues
faced by the CPUC in its decision to limit the Caller ID service in Cali-
fornia based on privacy concerns. The article will also review the
CPUC's efforts, within the context of that decision, to reconcile the inter-
ests of individuals and businesses who believe they have a right to "infor-
mational privacy" with the demands of business to use this "personal
information" to promote commercial activity, and the demands of the
public to have full access to information that affects the public good.
Finally, the article will conclude with a discussion of whether "informa-
tional privacy" should be controlled by state or federal law. More specif-
ically, in this regard, the article will address the recent Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPR) which suggests that the FCC has the power to preempt conflict-
ing state laws on the issue of "informational privacy."2
To understand and properly analyze the questions surrounding pri-
vacy and the telecommunications system, it is important first to look at
the historical roots of the "right to privacy."
I
Federal Constitutional Protection of Privacy
Privacy was not acknowledged as a distinct right until late in the
nineteenth century. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
published an article in the Harvard Law Review entitled The Right to
Privacy.13 They defined privacy as an individual's right to be free from
12. In the Matter of Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification Service,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CC Dkt. No. 91-281, FCC 91-300 (Oct. 23, 1991).
13. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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unwanted intrusions by the public into private matters, or "the right to
be left alone."14 Before this time, privacy was indirectly protected under
the common law principles of property and contract law.15 Since the
Warren/Brandeis article was published, the concept of privacy as a legal
right has been applied in various situations to protect personal matters
that an individual does not want to be made public.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, in the landmark abortion case of Roe v.
Wade,16 stated:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy. In a
line of decisions, however, ... the Court has recognized that a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or
individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in
the First Amendment, . . . in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments .... in
the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, ... in the Ninth Amendment...
or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment .... These decisions make it clear that only per-
sonal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" . . . are included in this guarantee of per-
sonal privacy."' 7
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Harris v. United States, 8 "The
rights of privacy ... are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitu-
tional liberty; and the guarantee of them is as important and as impera-
tive as are the guarantees of the fundamental rights of the individual
citizen." 19
Court decisions upholding the right to privacy have relied on the
First Amendment,20 the Ninth Amendment, 1 and the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 Similarly, the
Fourth Amendment has offered fertile ground for the development of a
right to privacy. The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unrea-
14. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 195.
15. SAMUEL H. HOFSTADTER & GEORGE HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 18
(1964).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Id. at 152.
18. 331 U.S. 145 (1946).
19. Id. at 150 (quoting Gould v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921)).
20. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986), recognizes that just as an individual has a right to
affirmative free speech, he or she has a concomitant federal constitutional right not to speak.
See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943); cf. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 524,
559 (1985).
21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977);
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457-59 (1977).
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sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. .."I' The Fourth
Amendment protects individuals from governmental intrusion in areas in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.24 For example,
the Fourth Amendment protects the content of a telephone conversation
on a private line. 25 However, private information voluntarily shared
with a third person is not protected, because the third person may pass
the information on to the authorities, and therefore the first person has
no expectation of privacy.26 Therefore, while the Fourth Amendment
protects the content of a telephone call, it does not necessarily protect the
identification of the caller or of the callee. This is so because the caller
voluntarily gives the phone company this information when placing the
call to and/or from a privately-owned telephone. Such information
could be used by the authorities without violating the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights.27
Defining the right to privacy as a question of "expectation" leads to
concerns about the breadth of the right. On this issue, Professor Louis
Henkin wrote:
The freedom of speech, press and religion required extraordinary judi-
cial protection against invasions even for the public good, because of
their place at the foundation of democracy and because of the unrelia-
bility of the political process in regard to them. If other rights-those
to be described as within the Right of Privacy-are also to be specially
guarded against the democratic process, similar or other justifications
must be found-if there are any. Perhaps unusual respect for auton-
omy and idiosyncrasy as regards some "personal" matters is intuitively
felt by all of us, including Justices: that such deference is "self-evi-
dent" is not self-evident.2
II
California Constitutional Protection of Privacy
The right to privacy is an inalienable right in California.29 In 1974,
the California Constitution was amended to state: "All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
25. Id at 351.
26. United States v. Jacobson, 46 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
27. State v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 497, 505 (Minn. 1985).
28. Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1429 (1974).
29. California's state constitutional right to privacy was adopted pursuant to the Initiative
Process in November, 1972, and reworded by a further constitutional amendment in Novem-
ber, 1974, both by a two-thirds majority vote. See White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233 n.9 (Cal.
1975).
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privacy.""a The California Supreme Court interpreted the amendment in
White v. Davis, stating that "the moving force behind the ... constitu-
tional provision was ... the accelerating encroachment on personal free-
dom and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection
activity in contemporary society. The new provision's primary purpose
is to afford individuals some measure of protection against this most
modern threat to personal privacy."31
The proponents of this constitutional provision included a statement
in the state election brochure that read in part:
The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is threat-
ening to destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies seem
to be competing to compile the most extensive sets of dossiers of
American citizens. Computerization of records makes it possible to
create "cradle-to-grave" profiles of every American. At present there
are no effective restraints on the information activities of government
and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of
privacy for every Californian.
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamen-
tal and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our
thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our free-
dom of communion and our freedom to associate with the people we
choose. It prevents government and business interests from collecting
and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from misusing
information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes
or to embarrass us.
Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulation of
personal information. This is essential to social relationships and per-
sonal freedom. The proliferation of government and business records
over which we have no control limits our ability to control our per-
sonal lives. Often we do not know that these records even exist and we
are certainly unable to determine who has access to them. 32
A person's right to privacy is further protected under section 13 of
the California State Constitution, which ensures "(t)he right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against un-
reasonable seizures and searches."'3 3 Like the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, this section has been applied to protect
telephone users and their private information. In People v. Chapman, 4
the California Supreme Court held that police violated a defendant's con-
stitutional right to privacy by obtaining his address and unlisted phone
number from a phone company without a warrant.3 5 The court ac-
30. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
31. White, 533 P.2d at 233.
32. Id. at 233 (emphasis added) (quoting Nov. 1972 STATE ELECTION BROCHURE).
33. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
34. 679 P.2d 62, 71 (Cal. 1984).
35. Id.
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knowledged that a telephone user with an unlisted number has a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his name and address.36
In Chapman, the court relied in part upon People v. Blair,37 which
held that a hotel guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the calls
placed from his hotel room.38 The Blair court held that the list of calls
placed from the hotel room could not be obtained by the police without a
warrant.39 These cases illustrate the willingness of the California
Supreme Court to hold that telephone users have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their names, addresses, and numbers called under the
California State Constitution.
III
Federal Statutory Protection
Because the constitutional right to privacy only protects against
governmental intrusions,' federal and state laws have been passed to
protect against intrusions by private parties." Generally, the federal pri-
vacy laws have been based on the concept that Americans have an indi-
vidual right to limit the circulation of personal information about
themselves and to have access to any information collected.42 Also, this
right to informational privacy cannot be infringed without a strong
showing of need and a guarantee that all necessary safeguards are in
use.4 3 Federal law attempts to balance the right of an individual to be
left alone with the public's right to have access to information in order to
ensure the health and safety of society and to monitor and evaluate the
activities of government."4
The most significant of these laws is the Privacy Act of 1974, 45
which attempts to meet this goal by balancing the legitimate needs of
both government and the private sector for information while upholding
the rights of an individual. The Privacy Act creates legal remedies to
correct the harm caused by intrusion into personal information by com-
36. Id.
37. 602 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1979).
38. Id. at 746-47.
39. Id. at 748.
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
41. Id.
42. See Gordon C. Everest, Nonuniform Privacy Laws: Implications and Attempts at Uni-
formity, in COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY IN THE NEXT DECADE (Lance Hoffman ed., 1980);
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(6) (1992).
43. Everest, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 522a (1992).
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puter-based data systems.46 Subsequent federal legislation has also put
value on the right of privacy.47 These laws bring privacy into the debate
when issues such as freedom of information, efficiency of operations, and
delivery of new services are raised in the regulation of information serv-
ices and technology.
Nowhere is legislative concern regarding informational privacy
more evident than in telecommunications. In 1986, Congress enacted the
Wiretap Act.48 This Act prohibits the unauthorized use of devices that
identify the numbers dialed on a telephone or identify the origin of a call
placed to another number.49 Similarly, the Electronics Communications
Privacy Act prohibits the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and
electronic communications.5" Just a few years after these legislative en-
actments, the Bell Operating Companies began offering Caller ID. Con-
gress recently debated whether these acts need to be amended to legalize
the Caller ID service.51 An important issue was whether a caller must
have the ability to block the identification of the number from which the
call is placed before such a service can be allowed.52
IV
California Statutory Protection
In 1967, the California Legislature acknowledged the importance of
privacy in telephone use by enacting section 630 of the California Penal
Code. Section 630 states:
The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and technol-
ogy have led to the development of new devices and techniques for the
purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications and that the
invasion of privacy resulting from the continual and increasing use of
such devices and techniques has created a serious threat to the free
exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and civi-
lized society.
46. See Privacy and Information Technology-The Years Ahead, in COMPUTERS AND PRI-
VACY IN THE NEXT DECADE (Lance Hoffman ed., 1980).
47. See Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1991); Privacy Protection
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-11 (1991); Family Educational Privacy and Rights Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (1989); Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 705 (1991); Electronic Fund Transfer Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1991).
48. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (1992). The Act specifically provides that more restrictive state
laws are not precluded by federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 276 (2d
Cir. 1974), cct. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1968).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (1991).
50. Id. § 2511(l)(d).
51. The CPUC found in its Caller ID decision that the Caller ID service was exempt from
provisions of the Wiretap Act. See id. § 3121(b)(l)-(3). In re Pacific Bell. No. 92-06-65, slip
op. (CPUC June 17, 1992).
52. See 136 CONG. REC. E782-84 (daily ed. March 22, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Kastenmeier).
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The Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of pri-
vacy of the people of this state .... 53
Several provisions of this chapter prohibit wiretapping. 54 These sec-
tions generally protect the content of confidential communications. It is
noteworthy that this chapter generally does not apply to public utility
companies that provide communication services and facilities "for pur-
poses of construction, maintenance, conduct or operation of the services
or facilities . . . ."" The sections are also inapplicable to any telephonic
communications systems that are exclusively interstate, intercounty, in-
tercity, or within city correctional facilities. 6
Privacy in telecommunications is also protected in the California
Business and Professions Code. Under section 16606, customer lists of
answering services are trade secrets and, consequently, confidential infor-
mation. This section protects both the names and addresses of the cus-
tomers of the answering services." Section 22600 of the California
Business and Professions Code protects the phone numbers of subscrib-
ers to facsimile (Fax) machines.58 This section requires the consent of
the subscriber prior to disclosure of the subscriber's Fax number.59 The
California Business and Professions Code section 22760 also protects
cordless phone users by requiring certain protections on all cordless
phones manufactured after 1992.o
In addition, sections of the California Public Utilities Code protect
the privacy rights of consumers. California Public Utilities Code section
2891 states in part:
No telephone corporation ... shall make available to any other person
or corporation, without first obtaining the residential subscriber's con-
sent, in writing, any of the following information:
(1) The subscriber's personal calling patterns ... excluding the
identification to the person called of the person calling and the tele-
phone number from which the call was placed....
(2) The residential subscriber's credit or other personal financial
information ....
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 630 (West 1992).
54. See id. § 631, akin to the federal Wiretapping Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27; § 632 (eaves-
dropping on or recording confidential information); and § 632.5 (intercepting cellular phone
calls).
55. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631, 632, 632.5 (West 1992).
56. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631(b), 632(b) (West 1992).
57. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16606 (West 1992).
58. Id. § 22600.
59. Id.
60. Section 22760 requires all cordless phones made after January 1, 1992, to provide
"increased protection from unintentional line seizure and dialing, and protection from unin-
tentional ringing." This section does not, however, protect against intentional line seizure. Id.
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(3) The services which the residential subscriber purchases from
the corporation or from independent suppliers of information services
who use the corporation's telephone or telegraph line to provide ser-
vice to the residential subscriber.
(4) Demographic information about residential customer or sub-
scribers, or aggregate information from which individual identities and
characteristics have not been removed.61
California Public Utilities Code section 2891.1 further limits the use
of information about a subscriber: "[A] telephone corporation selling or
licensing lists of residential subscribers shall not include the telephone
number of any subscriber assigned an unlisted or unpublished access
number.",62
Section 2891.1 was added to the code because telephone companies
have information about subscribers' names, addresses, billing addresses,
credit information, telephone numbers, calling patterns, and types of tel-
ephone services utilized. 63 Such information has traditionally been dis-
closed only in very specific circumstances.' Most private companies
may do what they wish with their customer information, subject to laws
such as credit disclosure, including packaging and selling the informa-
tion. Telephone companies are limited in their ability to disclose sub-
scriber information because, unlike with most firms, customers have no
choice but to provide private information to a local exchange company in
order to receive service.
Telephone companies have traditionally provided some information
to outside entities with little controversy. For example, directory assist-
ance routinely provides subscribers' telephone numbers when a requester
knows the name and at least part of the address. Printed White Pages
directories provide subscribers' telephone numbers and may provide ad-
dresses. Subscribers, however, may request to be unlisted in either the
published or the dial-up telephone directories. In general, both the direc-
tory assistance and white pages listings are free, but there may be charges
to be unlisted or unpublished. There may also be charges to obtain infor-
mation from local or long-distance directory assistance.
Telephone companies often have tariffs that allow the release of sub-
scriber information including name, address, billing address, and tele-
phone number in list form, aside from the white pages directory. Such
services include "reverse directories"-lists of subscribers sorted by tele-
phone number-and street address directories. Reverse directories and
other similar lists are often used for political and marketing purposes.
61. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2891 (West 1992).
62. Id. § 2891.1.
63. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
64. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2891 (West 1992).
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As discussed above, California Public Utilities Code section 2891
prohibits the release, without prior consent, of residential information,
including personal calling patterns, credit, or other personal financial in-
formation (except to other regulated utilities), services obtained by the
subscriber, or demographic information about the subscriber either as an
individual or in aggregate. Emergency services and law enforcement
agencies may obtain such information under some circumstances.65
While the legal trend has been in favor of protecting an individual's right
to informational privacy,66 marketing firms and the wide availability of
new technology that can capture calling patterns and phone numbers
threaten to undermine this protection.67 Thus, policy decisions that bal-
ance these competing interests may increasingly recognize the needs of
commercial interests.
Caller ID service is one of the first of many information services that
directly raises issues regarding an individual's right to informational pri-
vacy. The manner in which the judicial system handles this issue may
indicate, on a practical level, the degree of informational privacy that an
individual may reasonably expect as the United States fully enters the
"information age."
V
Caller ID in California
A. Background
The California proceeding seeking approval of Caller ID6 8 and sev-
eral other CLASS (Custom Local Access Signaling Services)69 features
began when Pacific Bell (Pacific) filed Application (A.) 90-11-011 with
the CPUC on November 9, 1990, requesting approval to offer new
COMMSTAR Custom Calling Services.7" The seven new COMMSTAR
features are Priority Ringing, Repeat Dialing, Select Call Forwarding,
Call Block, Call Return, Caller ID, and Call Trace.71
65. See id.
66. THE NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UTILITY CUSTOMER INFOR-
MATION: PRIVACY AND COMPETITIVE IMPLICATIONS (1992).
67. Id.
68. It should be noted that this term is a misnomer. Callers are not identified; the calling
number is. Therefore, the more accurate term is "Calling Number Identification." For ease of
reference, however, the term Caller ID will be used.
69. CLASS is the industry term for these services, which will be provided by means of
Signaling System Seven (SS7) technology.
70. Pacific used the term COMMSTAR to apply to its Custom Calling Features. The
term has since been changed to Custom Calling Services, effective March 15, 1991.
71. See A. 90-11-011 (filed Nov. 9, 1990). For the sake of convenience, this article will
use the names designated by Pacific Bell. The other telephone utilities proposed to offer simi-
lar features with slightly different names. However, the CPUC has asked in its Interim Deci-
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On December 28, 1990, Contel of California (Contel) filed a similar
application 72 requesting approval of its new Custom Calling Plus Service,
which included a Caller ID service.73
The Pacific and Contel applications were consolidated on January
25, 1991. In addition, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that
GTE California's (GTEC) application for Caller ID as part of its Smart-
call Services would also be consolidated.74
After statewide public hearings and evidentiary hearings, the ALJ
submitted a proposed decision granting the requested authority, with the
exception of Caller ID.7 1 The proposed decision held that Caller ID,
with any type of blocking, would constitute an unwarranted intrusion on
state and federal privacy rights of Californians. 76 The proposed decision
further held that Caller ID was not in the public interest because its det-
riments outweigh its benefits.77
The CPUC disagreed with the disposition of the Caller ID service in
the proposed decision. It decided to offer Caller ID on an interim basis
with various blocking options,7 18 to be discussed below. The remainder of
the proposed decision was sustained. 79 Hence, the Interim Decision, au-
thorizing a two-year market trial of Caller ID with three blocking op-
tions, was issued on June 17, 1992.80 The consensus among the
consumer-oriented groups was that the Interim Decision was one with
which they could live.
Pacific and Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) filed ap-
peals of the decision before the Commission by means of rehearing appli-
cations. The Commission responded to the rehearing applications on
November 23, 1992, in D.92-11-062. This decision modified D.92-06-065
and ordered a limited rehearing on issues related to the per call enabling
option. In all other respects, rehearing was denied. A prehearing confer-
ence was held on January 21, 1993. Notwithstanding Pacific Bell's state-
sion that the utilities offering CLASS services use the same terminology in the interest of
uniformity.
72. A. 90-12-065 (filed Dec. 28, 1990).
73. Contel proposed to introduce the following seven new Custom Calling Plus Service
Features: Call Block, Return Call, Call Trace, Caller ID, Priority Call, Repeat Call, and Se-
lective Call Forwarding. See id.
74. The eleven services for which GTEC requested approval on January 31, 1991 in A.
91-01-039 are: Automatic Busy Redial, Automatic Call Return, VIP Alert, Call Block, Spe-
cial Call Forwarding, Special Call Waiting, Special Call Acceptance, Call Tracing Service,
Calling Number ID, SmartCall PAK 4400 and SmartCall PAK 4900.
75. Proposed decision of ALJ Lemke, Ordering 1, at 97-98 (issued Jan. 21, 1992).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 93.
78. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065, slip op. (CPUC June 17, 1992).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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ment in a press release that it did not intend to offer Caller ID in
California at this time, it and other applicants were directed to partici-
pate in the rehearing unless a motion to withdraw their applications was
granted. New hearing dates have not yet been established."'
B. What the Decision Provides
1. Summary
In re Pacific Bell granted interim authority to the three applicants
(Pacific, Contel, and GTEC)82 to provide certain new privacy-related
CLASS services for a trial period of two years.83 The decision also
granted the request to offer the Caller ID service provisionally, 4 thereby
rejecting that portion of the AL's proposed decision that recommended
denial of the introduction of Caller ID. The Commission reasoned that
offering Caller ID is in the public interest and found that Caller ID
would not constitute an unwarranted intrusion on the privacy rights of
Californians if provided under the conditions outlined in the decision. 5
2. Rationale
In the final analysis, the Commission's decision came down to
whether the Caller ID service was in the public interest. The privacy
implications of authorizing the service were considered to be "necessarily
part of our public interest analysis."8 6 The Commission determined,
however, that the overall costs and benefits of the Caller ID service were
not as readily ascertainable as those of other proposed CLASS services.
Therefore, the Caller ID service was offered on an interim basis for a trial
period of two years.8"
In offering the Caller ID service on an interim basis, the Commis-
sion reasoned that to be consistent with privacy interests Caller ID could
only be offered in conjunction with the privacy protections and other
requirements enumerated in the decision.88 Those protections include
extensive customer notification and education programs, a choice of
blocking options, and periodic compliance and tracking reports.89
81. Assigned Commissioner's Ruling, at 1 (filed Feb. 11, 1993). Decisions of the CPUC
are first appealed to the CPUC by way of an application for rehearing and then directly to the
California Supreme Court. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1731(b) (West 1988).
82. Additionally, the decision approved non privacy-related CLASS services.
83. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065, slip op. (CPUC June 17, 1992).
84. Id. at 2.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2-3.
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In its constitutional analysis of the Caller ID service, the majority of
the Commission concluded "that the authorities which speak most force-
fully on the issue of privacy are directed at disciplining forces of govern-
ment (especially the police) and protecting the right of citizens to engage
freely in. . . 'political speech.' "90 In contrast, the concurring opinion by
Commissioner Shumway persuasively argues that a distinction between
violations of privacy by the government and violations by private parties
is misplaced when viewed in a California setting.9
In his concurrence, Commissioner Shumway reasoned that White v.
Davis92 made it clear that the state constitutional privacy amendment
was enacted to restrain the information-gathering activities of "govern-
ment and business." a California appellate courts have also read White
as establishing that nongovernmental parties may be found to violate the
constitutional right of privacy. 94
Even if the state constitutional privacy amendment did not pertain
to nongovernmental parties, Shumway asserted that it cannot reasonably
be argued that state action is not present in the authorization of Caller
ID in California. Therefore, there is no need to make a distinction be-
tween state action and private action under these circumstances." In
Huntley v. Public Utilities Commission. ,96 the California Supreme Court
made it clear that a telephone company is a state actor, at least to some
degree:
[T]he telephone company is a public utility subject to the control of the
commission, a state agency. The proposed tariff is efficacious only be-
cause of state action. Constitutional scrutiny of state action is not
predicated upon finding a direct restriction, there only need be a causa-
tive relation between the state action and the obnoxious result.
97
Shumway also felt that the distinction that the majority decision
made between political speech and other speech was unnecessary for the
purposes of constitutional analysis. The Commission relied in part on
Talley v. California98 and Huntley99 as authority for drawing a distinc-
90. Id. at 25.
91. Id. at 1 (Shumway, C., concurring).
92. 533 P.2d 222, 233 (Cal. 1975).
93. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065 at 1.
94, See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 200 (Ct. App. 1989)
(stating that "the courts [are] unanimous in holding that the state constitutional privacy provi-
sion provides some protection against nongovernmental intrusion"); accord Semore v. Pool,
266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Ct. App. 1990).
95. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065 at 3.
96. 442 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1968).
97. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
98. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
99. 442 P.2d at 685.
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tion between political and other speech. 100 While it is true that both
cases involved political speech, Shumway asserted that political speech is
not entitled to any greater protection than any other kind of speech. 0 '
The First Amendment protects the free flow of ideas and communica-
tion, no matter what the content. 102 Shumway concluded that except
under "extremely limited exceptions, such a content-based distinction is
inimical to the fundamental application of the First Amendment."' 0 3
3. Blocking Options
The Commission recognized in its opinion that an integral part of
whether Caller ID would constitute an unwarranted intrusion on the
right to privacy was the manner in which the service was to be offered.
The issue of which blocking options would be made available has every-
thing to do with whether Caller ID is in the public interest and whether
the right to privacy would be jeopardized. Therefore, the Commission
authorized three blocking options: 1) per call blocking, 2) per line block-
ing, and 3) per line blocking with per call enabling."° Blocking will be
provided free of charge, and one's blocking option may be changed free
of charge one time; thereafter, a charge will apply.'0 5 With per call
blocking, the calling party would have to press three digits (*67) in order
to prevent the disclosure of the calling party's number. Per line blocking
prevents disclosure of the calling party's number for all calls made from
a blocked access line. All parties with access lines would have a choice of
per line or per call blocking. In per line blocking with per call enabling, a
party would have to notify the telephone company that he or she wants
all calls blocked, except those specifically unblocked by pressing a three-
digit code. 0 6
For those subscribers who fail to make an affirmative choice as to
which blocking option they prefer, they will be assigned, by default, per
call blocking if they are published subscribers. Unlisted or nonpublished
customers who do not make a choice will be defaulted to per line block-
ing with per call enabling.'0 7 Consistent with People v. Chapman,' the
100. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065, slip op. at 28 (CPUC filed June 17, 1992).
101. Id. at 3-4.
102. Id. at 28, 35.
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id. at 35.
105. Id. at 40-41.
106. The Interim Decision envisions the use of a code other than *67 in order to unblock
number delivery. Some jurisdictions use the same code to block and unblock, which has cre-
ated some confusion. To avoid confusion, the Interim Decision calls for a different code to
unblock. The technological capability of using a different code to unblock is or soon will be
available. Id. at 36 n.20.
107. Id. at 40-41.
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Commission found a heightened expectation of privacy in unlisted or
nonpublished information. 10 9 Emergency service providers, such as po-
lice and shelters for battered spouses, will also receive the default protec-
tion of default per line blocking with per call enabling. These
organizations were deemed to have special and legitimate needs for pre-
cluding the disclosure of the calling number.l"°
4. California Market Trial
The decision in In re Pacific Bell grants authority to the utility ap-
plicants to provide Caller ID and certain other privacy-related CLASS
services for a trial period of two years, to be reevaluated after that period
based on experience with the service.11 Allowing a California market
trial is important because the record does not contain any unbiased, relia-
ble data which the Commission could have used in assessing how Caller
ID will impact California ratepayers. The utilities relied on surveys con-
ducted in Canada, New Jersey, Kentucky, and Rochester, New York.' 1 2
These surveys were successfully challenged as to their applicability to
California ratepayers.
C. By Balancing Privacy Rights with Technological Innovation, the Interim
Decision Found Caller ID to Be in the Public Interest
In re Pacific Bell is an attempt to determine what is in the public
interest by balancing privacy rights with technological innovation. It
was unavoidable that if the CPUC were going to respect the ratepayers'
right to privacy and also honor the utilities' desire to introduce new tech-
nology, the decision would have to be a compromise that gives proper
weight to these sometimes conflicting interests. Both interests are pro-
vided for in the Public Utilities Code by which the CPUC is governed.
Public Utilities Code section 709, recognizing the importance of innova-
tion, states that the telecommunications policies for California are:
(a) To assure the continued affordability and widespread availa-
bility of high quality basic telephone service for all Californians.
(b) To encourage the development and deployment of new tech-
nologies and the equitable provision of services in a way which effi-
ciently meets consumer need and encourages the availability of a wide
choice of state-of-the-art services. 113
108. 679 P.2d 622 (Cal. 1984).
109. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065, at 41.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 78.
112. Id. at 16.
113. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 709 (West Supp. 1992).
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While this statute recognizes the importance of technological innovation,
the legislature recognizes California's rich history of preserving the right
to privacy. The privacy provisions in the Public Utilities Code have their
roots in the California Constitution and myriad state statutes. As dis-
cussed above, Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution specifi-
cally bestows on all Californians the inalienable right to privacy.1 14
Californians cherish this right and guard their privacy zealously; this is
reflected in the high number of nonpublished telephone subscribers.
More than one-third of California's telephone subscribers have unlisted
numbers. 115
The California legislature, while encouraging technological innova-
tion, was concerned that scientific advances might erode the right to pri-
vacy. Therefore, as discussed above, it passed many statutes that
attempted to balance the conflicting privacy interests with technological
advances. In utility regulation, the legislature enacted an entire article
dealing with the customer right of privacy. 1 6 Public Utilities Code sec-
tion 2893 specifically targets Caller ID, making it clear that privacy oc-
cupies a high place in the panoply of statutory rights provided to all
Californians:
(a) Telephone subscribers have a right to privacy, and the protec-
tion of this right to privacy is of paramount state concern.
(b) To exercise their right of privacy, telephone subscribers must
be able to limit the dissemination of the telephone number to persons
of their own choosing.1 17
The legislature specifically provided in section 2893 that certain re-
strictions would be placed on Caller ID:
The commission shall, by rule or order, require that every telephone
call identification service offered in this state by a telephone corpora-
tion, or by any other person or corporation that makes use of the facili-
ties of a telephone corporation, shall allow a caller to withhold display
of the caller's telephone number, on an individual basis, from the tele-
phone instrument of the individual receiving the telephone call placed
by the caller.1 18
This restriction requires that the caller be allowed to block delivery of the
calling number. The restriction is not absolute, however, because the leg-
islature also enacted exceptions to section 2893.119
In sum, the decision complies with both statutes by providing access
to telecommunication and information services without forcing the new
114. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
115. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065, at 68.
116. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2891-93 (West 1992).
117. Id. § 2893 (Historical and Statutory Notes) (West 1992) (emphasis added).
118. Id. § 2893(a) (West 1992) (emphasis added).
119. Exceptions to § 2893 are specified in subsection (d), which states in pertinent part:
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technologies on those who do not want them. The choice of three block-
ing options is essential in balancing the new technologies with the right
to privacy. The decision further recognizes the heightened need for pri-
vacy for those subscribers with unlisted or nonpublished service by pro-
viding default per line blocking with per call enabling to nonpublished
customers. Arguably, the decision could have gone one step further by
offering default per line blocking with per call enabling to all telephone
subscribers.
D. What the Fight Was All About
1. Per Call Blocking Versus Per Line Blocking
The biggest battle waged during the hearings centered around the
choice of blocking options. If the CPUC intended to allow the introduc-
tion of Caller ID in California, the crucial issues were what blocking
options would be available, and to whom. Telephone utilities advocated
per call blocking only.1 20 Opponents maintained that the per call block-
ing option would not be adequate to protect the privacy interests of the
elderly, children, the mentally disabled, and those with language barriers.
They noted that per call blocking will require dialing up to fourteen dig-
its in a split-area-code local calling area in order to block the calling
party's number (*67-1-xxx-xxx-xxxx). They argued that this poses a tre-
mendous burden on the exercise of the per call blocking option. 21
In contrast, the utilities alleged that Caller ID provides for call
screening, and is a deterrent to obscene or harassing telephone calls. Op-
ponents responded that in a blocking environment such as California,
any deterrent effect will be obliterated because the harassing caller can
block the delivery of his number. The utilities countered that per line
blocking diminishes the value of Caller ID. After reviewing the record,
the CPUC concluded that this allegation had no factual basis. In fact,
(d) This section does not apply to any of the following:
(1) An identification service which is used within the same limited system
... including, but not limited to, a Centrex or private branch exchange (PBX) sys-
tem, as the recipient telephone.
(2) An identification service which is used on a public agency's emergency
telephone line or on the line which receives the primary emergency telephone
number (911).
(3) Any identification service provided in connection with legally sanc-
tioned call tracing or tapping procedures.
(4) Any identification service provided in connection with any "800" or
"900" access code telephone service until the telephone corporation develops the
technical capability to comply with (a), as determined by the commission.
Id. § 2893(d).
120. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065 at 36.
121. Id. at 16.
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the record shows the opposite. In spite of the availability of absolute per
line blocking in Nevada, that state had one of the highest penetration
rates in the nation.
12 2
The choice of blocking options hinged on the interpretation of Pub-
lic Utilities Code section 2893. The major telephone utilities interpreted
this statute to require per call blocking only. Consumer groups took is-
sue with that interpretation, arguing that section 2893 mandates per call
blocking as minimal privacy protection. The utilities based their inter-
pretation of the phrase "on an individual basis" on a letter by Assembly-
man Eaves, the author of Assembly Bill (AB) 1446, later enacted as
section 2893.123 Consumer groups contended that had it not been ambig-
uous, there would have been no need for a Commissioner to request clari-
fication of the term. Some suggested that the term could just as
reasonably mean individual calls or individual lines should be blocked,
rather than just individual calls.
However, Mr. Eaves' comments concerning interpretation of the
term are not admissible to establish legislative intent. The Eaves bill was
enacted in 1989. His letter in response to a Commission inquiry was
dated November 21, 1990. It is a basic tenet of law that legislative intent
is construed based on events occurring before a law is enacted. The U.S.
Supreme Court addressed this issue when it stated that "post-passage
remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legis-
lative intent ... expressed before the Act's passage."'124
The California Supreme Court has also spoken on this issue:
In construing a statute we do not consider the motives or understand-
ings of individual legislators who cast their votes in favor of it. Nor do
we carve an exception to this principle simply because the legislator
whose motives are proffered actually authored the bill in controversy;
no guarantee can issue that those who supported his proposal shared
his view of its compass. 12
5
Other legislators could not have relied on Eaves' letter when voting
on AB 1446. There is nothing in the legislative history that speaks di-
rectly to per call or per line blocking.
122. As of June 30, 1991, the penetration rate of Caller ID in Nevada was 5.1% of 400,330
total equipped access lines, one of the highest penetration rates in the nation. This was so even
though the penetration rate for absolute per line blocking was 5.9% of 334,170 access lines.
(Exhibit 57 DRA's Opening Brief, p. 31.)
123. Assemblyman Eaves wrote a letter in response to an inquiry from the CPUC as to the
meaning of "on an individual basis." He responded on November 21, 1990 that his bill envi-
sioned per call blocking. Letter from California Assemblyman Eaves to the California Public
Utilities Commission (Nov. 21, 1990) (on file with the Hastings Comm/Ent Law Journal).
124. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974); accord, United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 367 (1978).
125. In re Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Cal. 1976).
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The majority decision stated that "[w]e agree with the applicants
that section 2893 may be interpreted as requiring the provision of per-call
blocking."126 In view of the previous background already explored in the
hearings and post-hearing briefs, it is somewhat troubling that the Com-
mission would make this statement. Admittedly, the decision goes on to
require per call blocking as the minimum privacy protection because of
the statute's broad and somewhat ambiguous description of a blocking
mechanism. Strictly speaking, the decision is correct that section 2893
may be interpreted as requiring per call blocking. However, in view of the
ambiguity of the term "on an individual basis," it could be misleading
not to state within the same sentence that the term may also be inter-
preted to mean something else. A better construction would be for the
majority decision to have said that the phrase is subject to more than one
interpretation, and absent clear legislative history to define the phrase, the
Commission interprets it to mean per call blocking at a minimum.
2 Other Privacy Concerns
a. Call Return
It is noteworthy that the decision considered the privacy implica-
tions of features other than Caller ID. Although the evidentiary hearings
did not stress the potential impact on privacy of features such as Auto-
matic Call Return and Call Block, some parties did point out the poten-
tial privacy-related problems with these features.127 Call Return allows
the subscriber to identify the number of the last person who called, unless
that number is blocked as private. If the number is not blocked and the
subscriber activates the Call Return feature, the number of the last call
made to the customer's line will be announced and redialed automati-
cally if the customer so chooses. There are potential dangers associated
with Call Return, as well as possible privacy violations. Privacy can be
compromised each time a person returns a call without blocking.
As proposed by the utilities, even if the calling party initially blocks
the calling number, it will show up on the Call Return subscriber's bill if
it is a toll or message unit call. This may compromise the privacy of the
calling party with potentially devastating effects. For example, if the call
were initiated from a battered women's shelter and was blocked, the Call
Return subscriber could still get the telephone number when it appeared
on his telephone bill. This information could provide a valuable clue to
the location of the person who made the call, possibly endangering the
occupants of the women's shelter.
126. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065, slip op. at 36 (CPUC filed June 17, 1992).
127. Id. at 57.
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Also, if the last person to call is an obscene or harassing caller and
the called party activates Call Return, the party returning the call will
automatically be placed in contact with the very harasser sought to be
avoided. Call Return can also be used as a device to track a person's
comings and goings by keeping a record of when calls are returned.
The Commission was persuaded by these arguments and therefore
sought to remedy the privacy-related implications of Call Return by not
allowing the telephone number of the returned call, if marked private, to
be shown on the subscriber's bill.128 Ordinarily, a toll call number ap-
pears on the returner's phone bill. If the original call initiator blocks the
line, however, the last four digits of the initiator's number will not appear
on the bill. In this way the Commission has balanced the billed party's
expectation of an itemized bill with the call initiator's right to withhold
the phone number.
b. Voice Back/Announcement Technology
In addition to Call Return, there are several other privacy-related
CLASS services, including Call Block, that "voice back" the telephone
number in order to complete their functions. Select Call Forwarding and
General Telephone's Special Call Acceptance also have the ability to
identify the calling number through the "voice back" feature. Therefore,
they share some of the same privacy problems as Caller ID.
An example of how the voice back feature works may be seen in the
operation of Call Block. Call Block allows the customer to automatically
block the receipt of incoming calls from a list of up to ten telephone
numbers specified by the customer. Calls can be blocked from selected
telephone numbers, or from a number from which a customer has just
received a call. The Call Block subscriber can automatically add the last
incoming call to his or her list by activating Call Block. When this is
done, the system voices back the number just added to the list, or if per
call blocking is used by the calling party, it indicates that the last number
added is a "private entry." The Call Block subscriber can change the list
of numbers at any time. The calling party will receive an announcement
stating that "the party you are calling is not accepting this call."
From the above explanation the potential dangers inherent in the
voice back/announcement technology are clear. Suppose a battered
spouse has to contact children at home, and believes that the other
spouse does not have Caller ID. The parent either forgets to block the
calling number or is lulled into a false sense of security that there is no
need to block the number because the home does not have Caller ID. If
128. Id. at 77.
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the other spouse has Call Block and activates this feature, an announce-
ment will state that the Call Block feature is on and the actual telephone
number is added to the list of numbers on the Call Block list. The bat-
tered spouse's number will be revealed, further endangering that spouse
and violating privacy rights.
Although Call Trace is listed as a privacy-related feature, it has far
fewer privacy implications than Call Block, Call Return, or Caller ID.
Some argue that the privacy issue involved with this service is the right
not to be monitored or "followed" by telephone or in person. With Call
Trace, the customer may automatically request that the telephone com-
pany record a caller's originating number and the date and time of the
call, as well as the date and time of the customer-initiated trace. The
information is not released to the customer. It is securely stored by the
company and disclosed only to a law enforcement agency for investiga-
tion purposes.
Although these other features may not be as intrusive as Caller ID,
the Commission recognized that they implicate privacy interests, and in-
cluded them in the two-year trial period. 29 During this time, the utili-
ties will monitor the effects of these services, as well as Caller ID's effects,
and file compliance reports with the California Public Utilities Advisory
and Compliance Division. 13 0
c. Caller ID v. Call Trace as Deterrents
Another hotly debated issue was whether Caller ID would act as a
deterrent to annoying or harassing calls. The utilities argued that Caller
ID would deter obscene and harassing calls. Consumer-oriented groups
maintained that it would not.13 1 Pacific Bell introduced data from New
Jersey Bell containing alleged customer statements attesting to Caller
ID's effectiveness in reducing annoying, harassing, abusive, or threaten-
ing calls. 32 These statements were cited as proof that Caller ID was
effective in reducing those types of calls. 13 3 However, there was no em-
pirical evidence to support these allegations. 134
The consumer groups pointed out that the alleged deterrent effect of
Caller ID in a no-blocking jurisdiction such as New Jersey would not be
applicable in a jurisdiction, such as California, where some form of
blocking is mandated. A harasser could remain in the comfort of his or
129. Id. at 78.
130. Id. at 84.
131. Id. at 14.
132. Id., Exhs. 5 and 66.
133. Id., Transcript, v. 26, at 3212 et seq.
134. Id. at 3210-11, 3213.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 15:417
PRIVACY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
her home and merely block the telephone number from going forward.
The evidence shows that Call Trace was introduced at the same time as
Caller ID in New Jersey. No attempt was made to determine whether
the decline in obscene and harassing calls in New Jersey was due to
Caller ID or to Call Trace. 135 No witness was able to state positively
that the decline was due to Caller ID exclusively. 136
On the other hand, Call Trace is a very good deterrent to harassing
calls because it cannot be blocked, and the number, date, and time of a
harassing call are stored by the utility in a secure database. The tele-
phone subscriber does not have access to the calling number. This infor-
mation can be obtained by law enforcement agencies for use in a
courtroom for criminal prosecution of the harassing caller. Call Trace
obviates the need to confront the harasser directly and prevents escalat-
ing the situation into one of reverse harassment, which could occur if
Caller ID is used in an attempt to deter harassment.
Finally, Call Trace appeared to be universally accepted by all parties
as a social good. Call Trace is preferable to Caller ID because it deters
annoying, harassing, abusive, and/or threatening calls without the pri-
vacy implications of Caller ID.
E. An Assessment of the Interim Decision
The Commission wisely linked the authorization of Caller ID with
the blocking options to be offered. The blocking options are crucial in
any determination whether Caller ID is in the public interest and
whether it endangers the right to privacy. For this reason, the decision
authorized a choice of three blocking options, as discussed above. 13 7
Furthermore, the In re Pacific Bell decision recognized the privacy impli-
cations of other features. This article has shown how the Commission
addressed those privacy concerns. 13' By so doing, the decision shows its
respect for California's strong privacy traditions.
The decision heeded warnings by the Commission's ratepayer advo-
cacy staff and others of other potential problems.139 One potential prob-
lem is the use of an identical code both to block and to unblock.
Subscribers to Caller ID who were using per call blocking could not be
sure at any given moment whether they were blocking or unblocking.
135. See, e.g., Ronald v. Clarke, Deterring Obscene Phone Calls: Preliminary Results of the
New Jersey Experience, 1 SECURITY 143 (1990).
136. Pacific Bell's Mr. Fortescue, who sponsored the New Jersey Bell data, was forced to
concede that the numbers are not statistically significant. Transcript at 3210-13.
137. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
139. In re Pacific Bell, Ordering 6(1). This provision requires different codes for blocking
and unblocking.
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This potential confusion represents a real threat to subscribers who wish
to prevent their numbers from being revealed inadvertently.
Another positive provision of the decision is its recommendation
that the providers of Caller ID use the same terminology in order to
minimize confusion. 4° For example, a telephone user need not wonder
if Repeat Dialing, Repeat Call, and Automatic Busy Redial are the same.
They are, and they should be identified by one name.
The Commission also provided that customer messages should not
be sales pitches. 4' This provision is very significant because of the his-
tory of some utilities' abuse of marketing practices by providing services
not wanted by consumers.
1. Recommendations for Change
a. The Commission Has the Constitutional and Statutory Authority to Have
Provided Greater Protections for the Right to Privacy
The Commission in In re Pacific Bell recognized that it could have
authorized greater protections in terms of blocking options in order to
protect the right to privacy. The Commission stated that "[p]ursuant to
PU Code § 2893, this Commission may require more restrictive blocking
options to protect privacy, in place of, or in addition to, per-call block-
ing. '  The Commission enjoys broad powers granted by the California
Constitution in Article 12, section 5, and by the Legislature. In addition,
the Public Utilities Code section 701 states that the Commission "may do
all things, whether specifically designated in this part or in addition
thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such
power and jurisdiction."' 43 Therefore, the Commission could have rea-
sonably concluded that it is in the public interest to require the utilities to
provide per line blocking to protect the privacy interests so highly valued
by Californians. The Commission authorized default per line blocking
for some ratepayers. However, the decision does not go far enough.
b. The Decision Should Have Provided Greater Protections for Ratepayers
Who Are Not Nonpublished Subscribers
On the issue of default per line blocking, the decision authorizes
such blocking to nonpublished customers and emergency service organi-
zations only. 1" All other subscribers default to per call blocking. The
decision points out that more than one-third of California telephone sub-
140. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065 at 45.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1992).
144. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065 at 70, 71.
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scribers have unlisted or unpublished service. 145 The vast majority of
telephone subscribers have listed or published service. These customers
would have to key in *67 on each and every call in order to keep their
numbers private. This results in a serious degradation of service for most
California telephone subscribers. More importantly, the decision to re-
strict default per line blocking to those with unlisted or unpublished ser-
vice leaves the most vulnerable ratepayers at the mercy of unscrupulous
telemarketers. Persons sophisticated enough to go the extra mile in try-
ing to protect their privacy are in a better position to fend off unwanted
callers than are persons with language barriers, the elderly, the poor, and
the uneducated. Viewed in this light, all ratepayers deserve the protec-
tion of default per line blocking.
The Commission reasons that there will be comprehensive customer
notification and education programs (CNEPs), and telephone subscribers
who do not make an affirmative choice assume the risk of number disclo-
sure. 146 The rationale is that after the utilities submit and implement
satisfactory customer education plans, there will be universal knowledge
of the available blocking options. Therefore, those who receive per call
blocking, whether by affirmative choice or by default, will have given
their informed consent and assumed the risk of number disclosure for the
times that they forget to engage the blocking mechanism.147
The above premise is mistaken. Customers who do not subscribe to
nonpublished service do not assume the burden of activating Call Block-
ing any more than those who do subscribe. No CNEP will be so compre-
hensive as to assure that every person will be fully apprised of his or her
options. The record clearly shows that only fourteen percent of custom-
ers always read bill inserts. 14 Therefore, it is not reasonable to conclude
that Pacific Bell's CNEP will be so pervasive that every ratepayer should
be charged with having knowledge of the blocking options. If informed
consent and choice are the guiding principles of the majority decision,
the opinion should be modified to reflect that. All ratepayers deserve the
same protections.
2. Redlining
The Commission authorized the Anonymous Call Rejection (ACR)
provision, 149 a feature not requested by any of the applicants. This fea-
145. Id. at 68.
146. Id. at 45.
147. Id. at 39.
148. This figure was extracted from a 1989 tracking study conducted by GTE California.
In re Pacific Bell, Transcript, v. 12, at 1500.
149. Id. at 51.
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ture would allow a subscriber to reject (that is, to divert at the phone
companies' central offices) all calls that do not transmit the originating
phone number. Persons seeking to protect their published or nonpub-
lished number by blocking the number would not be able to make con-
tact with the party they are calling if that person or business has ACR. 150
The Commission declared that, while it does not direct implementa-
tion of ACR, it does grant permission to offer ACR during the trial pe-
riod, thus leaving it to market forces and consumer choice to determine if
the service is to be offered. 1 ' The concurring opinion of Commissioner
Shumway disagreed with offering this service on the basis that the record
is scant, and the belief that the telephone company should not offer a
service that intercepts phone calls before they reach the called customer's
premises unless the caller relinquishes his right of privacy. 1'
5 2
The majority decision dismissed concerns that Caller ID could be
used for unlawful redlining practices on the ground that the concerns are
largely speculative.' 53 However, there is a very real potential of Caller
ID facilitating the illegal act of redlining. Caller ID would make it diffi-
cult to detect, and therefore to document, redlining. The caller would
have no way of knowing if he or she was being discriminated against if a
business simply refused to answer or return a call based on the prefix,
diverted the caller to a "hold" line, assigned the caller to an inexperi-
enced representative, or charged higher rates.
Michelle White, representing the National Fair Housing Alliance
and Fair Housing Congress of Southern California, testified that in many
cases calls are not returned if the prefix of the caller is identified with a
minority neighborhood.154 Caller ID would make it easier to screen the
call without ever picking up the telephone.
To its credit, the CPUC directed its Advisory and Compliance Divi-
sion (CACD) to closely monitor any complaints of redlining or unlawful
discrimination through the use of the Caller ID service and to recom-
mend how such practices can be eliminated. 55
On balance, the Commission made a valiant attempt to accommo-
date the public interest with the conflicting interests of privacy and tech-
nological innovation. The majority decision is a step in the right
direction. The two-year market trial authorized by the Commission will
150. Id. at 52.
151. Id. at 51-52.
152. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065 at 6-7 (Shumway, C., concurring).
153. Id. at 55.
154. Id., Exh. 58, at 4.
155. In re Pacific Bell, No. 92-06-065 at 55.
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provide the data necessary to make a final decision that is in the best
interest of all Californians.
VI
Federal Preemption
This section addresses the threat of federal preemption of Califor-
nia's Caller ID decision. Currently, the FCC is considering whether it
has the authority and the desire to preempt state regulation of intrastate
Caller ID service that protects specific state constitutional guarantees re-
garding privacy. "'
A. A History of State and Federal Relations Before the Divestiture of
AT&T
Prior to the early 1980s, federal and state regulators operated under
the rule that states regulated intrastate communications, and the FCC
regulated interstate communications.1 57 When there was a conflict be-
tween these two interests, the two parties worked out a compromise.1 58
By 1982, free market crusaders gained control of the FCC and began
using the power of the FCC to transfer the telecommunications system
from a monopoly, dominated first by AT&T and later by the Bell Operat-
ing Companies, toward a nationwide integrated and yet competitive tele-
communications/information services system in which several companies
offer essentially the same service.1 59
While this goal may have been laudable, the FCC did not tradition-
ally have such sweeping jurisdictional powers because state governments
had regulatory jurisdiction over that seventy-five percent of the telecom-
munications system operating within the boundaries of the states. 160 Not
to be deterred, the FCC began a campaign to usurp the states' regulatory
powers by claiming that its federalist vision entitled it to assert federal
preemption over state jurisdiction. The FCC's attempts at preemption
156. While the FCC does not propose to preempt any specific state regulation of intrastate
Caller ID services at this time, it has expressed concern that inconsistent policies among the
states may impede the development of interstate Caller ID. The FCC invited parties to com-
ment on whether the FCC can and should preempt state regulation of intrastate Caller ID.
Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell have filed comments calling for federal preemption of state regu-
lation of intrastate caller ID. In re Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identifica-
tion Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 6752, 30-34 (1991).
157. 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)-(b) (1988).
158. FCC/NARUC Separations Manual, at 2; 47 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988).
159. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (2d Computer
Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Com-
mission's Rules and Regs. (3d Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F)
603 (1986).
160. FCC/NARUC Separations Manual, at 2.
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raised troubling questions about the fundamental structure of the regula-
tory framework that had governed the American telecommunications
system for half a century.
When Congress created the FCC in 1934, it envisioned a federal
agency that would regulate interstate telecommunication services, with
the expectation that state governments would continue to regulate intra-
state telecommunications. 161 Both the FCC and the various state regula-
tory agencies were set up in part to represent the interests of the
consumer.' 62 The authors of the Communications Act of 1934 defined
the rules for government regulation of telecommunication businesses
with only one monopoly player in mind-. In most cases, that player was
the Bell System.'63 As a result of the settlement of the antitrust suit in
1982, 64 the Bell System ceased to exist, but the federal law governing the
relationship of federal and state regulatory activity over the Bell System
remained unchanged.
1. Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC--States Retain Jurisdiction
After the Breakup of the Bell System
The competitors of the Bell Operating Companies were squarely be-
hind the FCC's efforts to open up the network to competitors and to rid
the scene of independent state regulation. Most of the Bell Operating
Companies, while opposed to opening up the network, were also in favor
of the looser regulatory environment envisioned by the FCC.
The war for control between the FCC and state government over the
regulatory power that governs intrastate communications began with a
battle over depreciation rates. The FCC issued a memorandum opinion,
in which it claimed that it had jurisdiction over intrastate deprecia-
tion, 65 an aspect of telephone service that had a long history of being
separated between the interstate and intrastate jurisdictions. To the utili-
ties, depreciation 6 6 is cash and the allocation of the money received by
161. 47 U.S.C. § 151-53 (1992).
162. Id. § 151.
163. STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY-THE BREAKUP OF AT&T(1986).
164. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), afftd, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983).
165. In re Amendment of Part 31, Uniform Sys. of Accounts for Class A and Class B Tel.
Cos., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 92 F.C.C.2d 864, 879 (1983), vacated, 2 F.C.C.R.
6399 (1987).
166. Depreciation means:
the loss not restored by current maintenance, incurred in connection with the con-
sumption or prospective retirement of telecommunications plant in the course of ser-
vice from causes which are known to be in current operation, against which the
company is not protected by insurance, and the effect of which can be forecast with a
reasonable approach to accuracy.
47 C.F.R. § 32.9000 (1991).
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utilities from its customers has traditionally been divided between intra-
state and interstate jurisdictions in a process called "separations.""'6 Ap-
proximately twenty-five percent of such funds were typically allocated to
the federal jurisdiction, and seventy-five percent were allocated to the
state jurisdiction.16
California and other states challenged the FCC ruling on the pre-
emption issue,169 but the federal government won the initial appeal. I7°
The Fourth Circuit found that the FCC had validly exercised its statu-
tory authority in "preempting inconsistent state action,"'' holding that
preemption is justified if the effect of state regulation would be to frus-
trate national policy objectives. 172 Since the telecommunications system
is interconnected and most state actions can be said to affect federal pol-
icy, the FCC could have, and in this case had, the authority to preempt
any independent state regulatory actions with which it disagreed.
2. States Take Their Case to the Supreme Court
Twenty-three states, including California, appealed this adverse rul-
ing to the United States Supreme Court.'73 The state litigants argued
that Congress had expressly denied the FCC any rulemaking power over
intrastate communication services, and, therefore, any FCC attempt to
preempt state regulation in this area was invalid. 7' The United States
Supreme Court agreed with the states that the Communications Act de-
nied the FCC authority to preempt the jurisdiction of the states to regu-
late intrastate telecommunications. 75 The Court went on to find that
under section 152(b) of the Communications Act, states retain jurisdic-
tion over intrastate communications unless it can be shown that "some-
thing has to give." The "something has to give" situation occurs only
when the FCC's asserted authority is a clear, affirmative, substantive au-
thority that is absolutely negated by state regulation. The fact pattern at
issue must involve a head-on collision, where the state regulation would
necessarily negate, not impair, a substantive federal regulation.' 76
167. See 47 U.S.C. § 410(c).
168. FCC/NARUC Sepirations Manual, at 2.
169. Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
170. Id. at 392-93. Exclusive jurisdiction over FCC final orders lies with the federal courts
of appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1988).
171. 737 F.2d at 392.
172. Id. at 396.
173. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
174. Id. at 367-68.
175. Id. at 370, 373.
176. Id. at 375 n.4.
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The Ninth Circuit later interpreted the language of the Louisiana
Public Service Commission case to recognize an "impossibility" exception
to the rule:
The impossibility exception, however, is a limited one. The FCC may
not justify a preemption order merely by showing that some of the
preempted state regulation would, if not preempted, frustrate FCC
regulatory goals. Rather, the FCC bears the burden of justifying its
entire preemption order by demonstrating that the order is narrowly
tailored to preempt only such state regulations as would negate valid
FCC regulatory goals.' 7
In essence, the Louisiana Public Service Commission holding se-
verely restricted the FCC's power to preempt state regulation of intra-
state communication.
The Supreme Court went so far as to rule that even when a situation
arose where there was a direct conflict between state and federal regula-
tory authority, every means had to be used to settle the conflict before
preemption could be invoked by the FCC. 17 1
B. The FCC's Preemption of Intrastate Information Services Is Thwarted
by the Ninth Circuit
The FCC's free market ideologues decided that, if they could not
assert federal preemption over basic services under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Communications Act, they would attempt to pre-
empt information services. They had adopted a policy officially known as
"Open Network Architecture," which allowed equal access to the net-
work for competitors offering information services. 179 The FCC claimed
that the network had to undergo a process known as "unbundling" to
allow competitors to offer information services and that the necessary
unbundling could occur only if all information services, including those
operating within a state, were dealt with uniformly.'
The Ninth Circuit got involved when California and a number of
other states challenged the FCC's preemption bid over information serv-
ices. 1 As mentioned, the court recognized the Louisiana Public Service
Commission language as allowing for a possibility of preemption, 182 but
found that the FCC was unable to meet the test. Despite these two sig-
177. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).
178. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n.4 (1985).
179. In re Amendment of §§ 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. (Third Computer
Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 201-22 (1986) (Phase I Order).
180. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1985), modified on reconsidera-
tion, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (Phase I Recon-
sideration), Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987) (Phase II Order).
181. California, 905 F.2d at 1217.
182. Id. at 1243.
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nificant defeats in Louisiana Public Service Commission and California,
the FCC has continued to try to chip away at state jurisdictional
authority. 183
C. Caller ID Is Next Likely Preemption Candidate for the FCC
Given this history, it is not surprising that when the FCC invited
parties to comment on whether the FCC can and should preempt state
regulation of intrastate Caller ID,184 Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell, as well
as other parties, filed comments that argued for FCC preemption of state
regulation of intrastate Caller ID. Specifically, they assert that preemp-
tion is both legal and necessary: necessary, because as a technical matter,
Caller ID is not separable into interstate and intrastate portions, and
legal, because state regulation is, in some cases, more restrictive than fed-
eral regulation and thus frustrates a valid federal policy to promote infor-
mation services such as Caller ID. On December 22, 1992, Pacific Bell
announced that it does not intend, at this time, to offer Caller ID services
in California because of the CPUC limitations. Pacific Bell's action ap-
pears to be motivated by a desire to enhance its preemption claim with
the FCC.
Given the presumption that states regulate intrastate communica-
tions as articulated in Louisiana Public Service Commission, the FCC has
a heavy burden of proof to establish that Caller ID presents a situation
that would justify federal preemption. The FCC would first have to
demonstrate that certain state regulation of intrastate Caller ID would
frustrate federal regulation of interstate Caller ID. This is going to be
difficult given that an estimated ninety percent of the traffic subject to
Caller ID regulation is intrastate in nature.185
1. Intrastate and Interstate Caller ID Are Separable
Moreover, the claim by Pacific Bell and other parties that intrastate
and interstate Caller ID services are technically inseparable has been re-
futed by Northern Telecom Inc., one of the largest telecommunications
183. See Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, CC Dkt. No. 90-368;
Computer III Remand Proceedings, CC Dkt. No. 90-368; and the CPUC appeal of these FCC
orders, California v. FCC, No. 90-70336 (9th Cir. 1990). This case raises the question of
whether the FCC exceeded its authority in requiring all basic service telephone service ele-
ments that are technically compatible with interstate access arrangements to be offered in fed-
eral tariffs.
184. See In re Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 6752 (1991).
185. In California, based on minutes of usage, roughly 90% of traffic initiating or terminat-
ing within the state is intrastate in nature. See § 410 (b) Joint Conference, Report on
Separations.
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equipment manufacturers in the United States.' 8 6 Northern Telecom
"has been intimately involved in the product definition, design, and de-
velopment of the hardware and software for common channel signalling
(CCS) using the signalling system 7 (SS7) protocols. One of the features
made available by CCS and SS7 is caller ID service."'8 7
In its comments, Northern Telecom states: "The Commission is
also seeking information on whether inconsistent interstate and intrastate
blocking policies can be accommodated. From a purely technical per-
spective, it would be possible to have different blocking policies, although
it would impose some additional developmental and operational
costs."'
The fact that different blocking options can be implemented for in-
terstate and intrastate calls originating and terminating in a state at some
level of cost indicates that it is possible to separate the interstate and the
intrastate components of the service. Therefore, FCC preemption over
state regulation of intrastate Caller ID services fails under the limited
"impossibility" exception to the Louisiana Public Service Commission
rule, which recognizes FCC preemption for inseparable services. 8 9
2. Fundamental Privacy Rights Embodied in a State's Constitution Are
Protected
Beyond the technical question of separability is the issue of whether
providing the service violates fundamental personal privacy protections
embodied in a state's constitution. For example, as has been discussed,
Californians value their personal privacy and have a high expectation of
privacy in their telephone communications. Nine of the ten areas in the
United States having the highest proportion of unlisted telephone num-
bers are located in California.' 90 Furthermore, in all major metropolitan
areas in the state, that proportion approximates fifty percent to sixty per-
cent. 19' Californians' interest in privacy gives rise to the question
whether federal economic regulation should predominate over the clear
will of the state's people to be protected from intrusion. Because Califor-
nia's constitutional guarantee to privacy was enacted by a two-thirds ma-
jority vote, the federal government should bend to the will of the state's
citizens.
186. Comments of Northern Telecom, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC
Dkt. No. 91-281, at 11-12 (Jan. 6, 1992).
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id. at 11-12.
189. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
190. SURVEY SAMPLING, INC., UNLISTED RATES OF THE TOP 100 MSAS FOR 1990
(1991).
191. Id.
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As a general matter, if there is a conflict between some element of
the federal regulation of commerce and a state constitutional right that is
not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, but is simply an elaboration
of or an expansion of a federal constitutional right, the state constitu-
tional right must prevail over the regulatory interest of a federal body.1 92
This is true unless there is an explicit finding or pronouncement in a
federal law effectuated by Congress that gives the federal regulatory body
specific authority to preempt conflicting state constitutional guaran-
tees. 193 In the case of Caller ID, there is no explicit federal law preempt-
ing state law, and the state constitutional privacy guarantees do not
conflict with the federal constitution; therefore, there is no legitimate ba-
sis on which the FCC can claim authority to preempt. However, given
the FCC's long record of disregard for the rights of states to regulate
intrastate communications, and in particular information services such as
Caller ID, it would not be surprising if the FCC once again attempted to
preempt state regulation. The result will be that California's carefully
reasoned and thoughtful "final decision" may not be final at all. It must
first withstand an FCC attack grounded in its insubstantial preemption
rights.
192. As part of its police powers, California, either through statutory enactment or consti-
tutional provisions (see supra discussion on California privacy law), has traditionally deter-
mined issues relating to the general welfare of its citizens. U.S. CONST. amend X; Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, , 461 U.S. 190 (1983);
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 625 (1944); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pacific
Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372, 374-75 (1919); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 77 (1886). State authority
exercised under its police powers is based on the premise that a state has unique knowledge of
its local problems, concerns, and needs. The U.S. Supreme Court, acknowledging this state
concern, has held that when a state is exercising its historic police powers, a federal statute
cannot be said to preempt unless there is a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229 (1947). The Court went on to say that the federal
purpose can be manifest in either pervasive federal regulation or in a federal interest so domi-
nant that the federal system of regulation will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject. Id. at 230; Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
In the case of Caller ID, no such finding can be made. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355, 370, 373 (1985).
193. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987).
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